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Manila, or Monroe Doctrine?

BY

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PHILIPPINE annexation, the dominant question of the hour, is so diametrically opposed to the principles embodied in the Monroe Doctrine that the people of the United States should make a careful study of the subject before abandoning a Doctrine that thus far has been a rudder to the ship of state and a guarantee of good faith to the whole world. When the point of departure from this Doctrine is clearly understood, the question will be found to involve a more momentous issue than has engaged the public mind since the close of the civil war.

INTRODUCTION

Importance of the Question

IT is universally conceded that the Philippine problem is The problem of the Spanish war. But the problem becomes comparatively simple if we decline annexation, and especially, if we decline it out of regard for the Monroe Doctrine. In such case there remains to consider, aside from requisite measures of reform, only what we shall demand by way of coaling or naval stations, trading and tariff concessions, and commercial "openings" along the Chinese coast for relinquishing territorial claims in the neighborhood.

On the other hand to remain at Manila and abandon the Monroe Doctrine, confronts us with a most serious question, serious not only for the United States, but for all civilized nations. Never until now have we faltered in allegiance to the Monroe Doctrine. It is the foundation, if not the corner stone, of the country's foreign policy since 1823, and we have always ascribed to it our tranquillity, security and freedom from enormous military

taxation, as well as our supremacy in the Western World. Less than three years ago to uphold this Doctrine we were facing war with a foe far more powerful than Spain, and at that time the public man who advocated yielding or risking the Monroe Doctrine for the sake of all Australasia, instead of, as now, only a small fraction of one of its distant islands, would have been consigned to the obscurity of private life.

Having become familiar with the origin and scope of the Monroe Doctrine, the writer has been impressed by the strangely scanty references to it at the present crisis. It is not to be expected that it would receive consideration from those that started the petitions for annexation, Chambers of Commerce, Boards of Trade, and similar bodies who naturally look at Manila through commercial spectacles, and thus fail to discern the weightier matters of diplomacy, statesmanship and international law. That the annexation press should do likewise is also natural.

On the other hand the attitude of the conservative papers has been puzzling. And June was well on into its second week before it was clearly intimated in Congress, as well as by a very eminent jurist, that Asiatic acquisition involved a virtual repeal of the Monroe Doctrine.

Even up to the present time many conservative people apparently unregardful of the Monroe Doctrine, seem satisfied with the lesser serious objections which they urge to annexation. Nevertheless the writer maintains that the Monroe Doctrine while the greatest is the easiest to understand, in fact, he believes the vital and controlling issue to be Manila, or Monroe Doctrine? He further believes that for the American people to fully understand the issue now at stake will result in their recording a decisive verdict against Manila.

San Francisco, Cal., Sept. 15, 1898.

CHAPTER I

What the Monroe Doctrine Means and Involves

THE Monroe Doctrine is an application to America of what Europe has long called "the balance of power." In effect it says to the nations of Europe, "since we do not meddle in your hemisphere, seek not to conquer or colonize in ours." We run counter to its spirit and letter if we annex portions of the Old World, and at the same time control the destinies of the New. "Imperialism" could stretch no further.

In this connection it is worth our while to consider the scope and meaning of the Monroe Doctrine to the men who formulated it. First, it will be interesting to note that the feature of Monroe's policy which has caused most controversy, the one forbidding further acquisition of American territory by Europe, originated with John Quincy Adams, Monroe's Secretary of State, and that the full name of the Monroe Doctrine should be the Monroe-Adams-Jefferson-Madison Doctrine.

For sometime before the appearance of President Monroe's message, our relations with Russia had been somewhat disturbed over the northwest boundary disputes, which were finally settled by the purchase of Alaska. At Washington on July 17, 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, stated to Baron Tuyl, Russia's representative, "that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonization establishments;" and this statement his son, Charles Francis Adams, has well called "the first hint of the policy afterward known as the Monroe Doctrine."[1] Writing on July 2, 1823, to Richard Rush and referring in a different connection to the same matter, our then minister to England, Mr. Adams, observes, "the American continents henceforth will no longer be subject to colonization."[2]

Mr. Adams' remark was caused by the newly formed coalition of the powers of Russia, Austria and Prussia in what was known as the Holy Alliance. These powers were just then apprehensive of the spread of democratic ideas,

[1] Charles F. Adams' Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, Vol. 6, page 163, and note.

[2] The Monroe Doctrine, by Geo. F. Tucker, Chap. 2, page 13.

and of the popular uprisings all over the world that seemed to menace their systems of government. For instance, revolutions were breaking out in Spain and Portugal, and the Spanish colonies in America had proclaimed and practically established their independence. The powers deputed to France the task of "restoring order" in Spain, and at the Congress of Verona, in 1822, the "Holy Alliance" seriously discussed bringing back to their allegiance the revolted colonies of Spain.

Then, at the suggestion of Mr. Canning, prime minister of England, the American president proclaimed his celebrated Doctrine. Meant to prevent interference by the European monarchies with the republics of America or their institutions, it was entirely successful. In embodying the idea designed to bar Europe from further extension of territory in America, the president went further than England wished —although not further than the American people have seemed to approve in the Venezuelan dispute.

Before preparing his message, Monroe consulted his predecessors in office, Madison and Jefferson. Mr. Madison, on October 30, 1823, in a letter to President Monroe refers to the dangers threatening, through the Holy Alliance, our neighbors on the south; to our interest in,

and sympathy with their republican institutions; and to "the consequences threatened by a command of their resources by the great powers",—considerations which "call for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade."[1] Mr. Jefferson was even more explicit. In replying to the president, he says: "The question presented by the letter you have sent me is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation, since that of Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course we are to steer through the ocean of time opening for us. . . . . Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle in cis-Atlantic affairs. America, north and south, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own separate and distinct from that of Europe."[2]

Thus fortified by able counsellors the president addressed to Congress the document of December 2, 1823. In it he refers to the negotiations pending with Russia and Great Britain

[1] Letters and Writings of James Madison, Vol. 3, page 339.

[2] Writings of Jefferson, published by order of Congress, Vol. 8, page 315.

for the amicable adjustment of their interests to ours on the northwest boundaries of the continent, and adds: "In the discussion to which these interests have given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may be terminated, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power."

Toward the close of the message the president refers to the popular agitations in Spain and Portugal, as to agitations on which we look with interest and sympathy, but without any disposition to interfere, for he remarks: "In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our interest to do so." But—"with the movements in this hemisphere, we are of necessity more immediately connected. . . . We owe it therefore to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and these powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to

our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere." And as to the American states which had declared their independence and been recognized by us, "we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them for controlling their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." He afterward repeats that our policy has been, and is, "not to interfere in the internal concerns of Europe," but as to this continent it is wholly different. European political systems cannot be extended "to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness." Reverting to the subject in his message of December 7, 1824, the president states: "It is impossible for the European governments to interfere in the concerns of our neighbors without affecting us."[1]

There are two propositions that stand out distinctly from the state documents just quoted. One, is that the powers are no longer to interfere or to extend their holdings in our sphere, or hemisphere; the other, is that we disclaim the thought or intention of extend-

[1] Statesman's Manual, by Edwin Williams, Vol. 1, pp. 452–3, 460–1 and 476.

ing our possessions in theirs. In view of the language of the message and of its context, it is difficult to understand why Americans of learning and ability should dispute either clause of the first proposition, which they do when they admit that Europe is forbidden to overturn any American government, but not that Europe is restrained from enlarging her holdings on this continent.

If those who dispute part of the first proposition stopped at this point, we might in answer merely refer them to the foregoing quotations. But they go even further, and denying our right or need to invoke against Europe the principle of non-extension on this hemisphere, open the way to utter annihilation of the Monroe Doctrine by destroying the moral basis upon which it stands. For the Monroe Doctrine ceases to be a Doctrine of equity and justice if while continuing to enforce it for American interest in the New World, we do not continue to refrain from interfering with European interests, that is with "the balance of power," in the Old World.

For instance, we enforced the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuelan affair. A waste of water and jungle and mining land was in dispute; England was pushing forward her borders and to all appearance had greatly en-

larged them, the intrinsic value of the soil may have been little, perhaps much less than was claimed. But the principle involved was very important. Under the guise of boundary contests the foreign powers can extend their possessions on the continents almost indefinitely, and without effectual resistance, unless from us. The appetite for land, once acquired, is hard to satisfy, as we ourselves begin to realize. It has to be checked at once, and this country with a true instinct, ranged itself naturally and rightfully beside the president in the Venezuela difference.

The second prominent point in Monroe's message, disavowing any intent to interfere in European affairs is so important as to belong to a new chapter.

CHAPTER II

Some Things the Monroe Doctrine does not Mean

IN saying "we have never taken part in matters relating to the European powers," and "our policy is not to interfere with their concerns," President Monroe embodied the thought if not the words of Thomas Jefferson, "our first

and *fundamental* maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe." This is quite plainly the meaning of President Monroe's message, and applies directly to the situation of affairs in the late Spanish war.

Had we carried that war into Europe or Northern Africa, as was more than once proposed, should we have been allowed a free hand there? We might have destroyed Spanish ships, and blockaded or bombarded Spanish ports, but it is certain the powers would have prevented any annexation of Spanish territory. Such an annexation would have given the United States fortified outposts on the soil of Europe which, in event of war with any foreign nation could be used as a base of attack.

Since the time of Monroe, in fact from the days of Washington, we have resisted every inducement or temptation to assume the conquering, menacing, undemocratic attitude involved in such a plan of campaign, though it has been gravely and frequently urged by the more violent organs of annexation.

Any attempt of the United States to grasp European soil would at once upset the delicate equilibrium of that continent, and be resented as insufferable aggression, and would resemble an effort by Germany or Russia to appropriate the Island of Cuba. In the late war if either

of these nations had been opposed to Spain, she might have destroyed Spanish shipping and blockaded Cuban ports or seized and occupied them temporarily. But any attempt to annex the island and substitute for decadent Spain a strong military power at our very doors would have aroused in us the instincts of self-protection. We would have reminded the victorious power, or invoked the Monroe Doctrine to remind her, that we had always confined our operations to our own hemisphere and had announced to the great powers of the other hemisphere that they must follow our example. Hitherto they have followed our example with some reluctance, but if we invade their hemisphere on the coast of Asia have we any right to suppose that they will continue to respect a Doctrine to what we have committed ourselves and which we will be the first to violate?

Of course at Manila we do not menace the stability of the powers as directly as we should at Ceuta or Cadiz; still, it must be remembered that Europe and Asia are not only in the same hemisphere but are virtually one continent. Even in the early days of the century Europe had projected itself at more than one point into Asia. Now with Russia ruling all the North, England mistress of a greatly widened India, France and Germany, England, Holland and

Spain holding vast provinces or islands along the eastern or southeastern coasts, the vast continent of Asia has practically become the annex of Europe.

At the Philippines we are in a nest of European or Japanese dependencies, with England and Holland to the south, France on the mainland opposite, Germany and England on the northwest, and the countries of Russia and Japan beyond. Such are the commercial, strategic and political advantages of the group that their transfer to any one of the rival powers, or their absorption by a strong new power will unquestionably disturb the equilibrium of Europeanized Asia. While neither Germany, Holland, France nor Russia would be affected by our annexing the Philippines as directly as they would be affected by our invasion of Spain or Morocco, why should we expect them to limit their objections to us as a neighbor in Europe only? We do not restrict the operation of the Monroe Doctrine to the near-by regions of Cuba or Venezuela; but extend it all the way to Cape Horn. And the latter is practically as remote from our territory on the Gulf of Mexico as Cochin-China is from Paris, or Kao-Chang from Berlin. Moreover we own no territory near Cape Horn to which French, German or Italian colonies would be

near neighbors, while we shall become a neighbor to colonies of these powers by remaining at Manila.

It hardly seems needful to argue further the inconsistency of trying to retain both Manila and the Monroe Doctrine, and it is becoming a matter of no small interest to ask what Europe will have to say on the subject. One of the powers, however, holds that we have already violated the Doctrine by taking Porto Rico and Hawaii. This assertion we cannot afford to ignore. For if we have already broken our traditional policy, and if that policy was the only thing that stood between us and Manila, we might as well take up our march to empire. Indeed if we have surrendered, or intend to surrender, our control of the American continents, looking at the matter from a commercial standpoint, in return we ought not to be satisfied with anything less than a continent, and we ought to set about securing it at once. When it is understood that the Monroe Doctrine is dead, and that the West Indies and South and Central America are open to the powers, as a beginning we should immediately join in and secure our slice of China.

However, the part of the message quoted shows that, so far, we have not broken the Doctrine in the smallest degree. That Doctrine for-

bids Europe to conquer or annex in this hemisphere for fear of disturbing its, and our equilibrium, and it inferentially pledges this country to respect the equilibrium of the other hemisphere. Europe could not be injured by any expansion of *ours* over here unless we annexed her territory, and she would not be *endangered* by that. In encroaching on any of our neighbors we would have to reckon with them alone, though of course, in acting unjustly we should receive and deserve the reproach of mankind.

From England came the suggestion that we have already broken the Monroe Doctrine. Though our recently improved relations with that power are one of the good results of the war, it must be carefully noted at this juncture that nothing would please Great Britain more than to have us as a neighbor in the far East. She stands there struggling to hold her own against Russia and France, if not Germany also, and without a single friend, unless it be Japan. Naturally she would welcome another friend, and be glad to form an "alliance." And it must be confessed that if we hold territory there we must expect rivals and enemies, and would therefore need friends ourselves. The "entangling alliance" so deprecated by Washington, may prove a necessity. It would be only a question of time.

The English themselves, to do them justice, are perfectly frank in this matter. *The Spectator* of July 16, 1898, dwells on the continental dislike of America, founded, like its hatred of England, on the progress and comparative prosperity of the two Anglo-Saxon powers. Europe classes the two together, says *The Spectator*, and puts them in the same boat,—where, the inference is, they naturally belong.

The *Saturday Review* of the same date asks: "Now how will the advent of the new power affect the Eastern equilibrium?" The question is answered thus: "From the selfish British point of view we hope that the Americans will take both the Canaries and the Philippines,—and if they wished a port on the coast of China besides, they should have our help in getting it. The weary Titan that Matthew Arnold spoke of, with every muscle strained by the weight of empire, challenged on this side and on that by new competitors, menaced now and then by a combination of envious enemies, suddenly now finds standing at his side a stalwart son, who, though he has his own place in the world, and his own ambitions, yet seems inclined to say that the old Titan shall always have at least a fair field, and if the worse comes to the worst, some little favor. And that is the way we British feel about America."

This is instructive as well as interesting. Equally interesting, perhaps, if not quite so instructive, will be a quotation from a letter in the New York *Tribune* of August 2, 1898, from its London correspondent on "Misconceptions About Monroeism." "English writers," says the correspondent, "assume that the Monroe Doctrine has been abandoned in the present conflict with Spain. An expression I constantly hear in conversation and read in print is 'Monroeism is dead.' The misconception arises from confounding the Washington Farewell Address with the *complement* of it in the Monroe Doctrine. The Washington principle was that Americans must remain out of European alliances and entanglements." The Monroe principle was that Europeans must keep their hands off the American continent, retaining such possessions as they already held but not enlarging their colonial holdings and conquests.

The United States in waging war with Spain for the deliverance of Cuba and Porto Rico from Spanish rule only recognized what the civilized world has acknowledged, namely: that Spain is no longer able to care for her colonial possessions. But the essential principle of Monroeism that European powers are not to enlarge their domain in the Western Hemisphere has not been renounced or compromised. Monroe-

ism is vitalized by the enlargement of American influence in the West Indies. The writer in the New York *Tribune* adds: "that if the powers were to assume the death of Monroeism they would speedily be convinced of its vitality," and then continues, "The invasion and occupation of the Philippines imply renunciation of the Washington doctrine of non-intervention in European affairs. This is what English writers have really in mind when they speak of repudiation of Monroeism two years after the Venezuela question was raised in an aggressive form. If the Americans proclaim a protectorate in that quarter they will enter upon a career of expansion which may menace European interests and draw them into entanglements with foreign Powers. The *Monroe Doctrine* will not be affected by the settlement of the Philippine question. The *Washington Doctrine* is at stake in the South Seas and may be fatally compromised if the Philippines are retained as a permanent American dependency."

We may entirely agree with the writer just quoted that the Monroe Doctrine is in no way impaired but "vitalized" by any of our acquisitions in this Hemisphere. But we must part company with him in one or two places where we have ventured to introduce italics. The

Washington Farewell Address Doctrine is called the "complement" of the Monroe Doctrine. But as the theory of our non-intervention in European entanglements runs through both, the address should be called not merely the "complement" but the foundation of the Monroe Doctrine. They are virtually the same thing where the annexation of Asia is concerned. The correspondent is therefore as correct in saying that the Washington Doctrine will be fatally compromised by retaining Manila as he is incorrect in holding that the Monroe Doctrine will *not* be.

It will also be noted that the correspondent is one of the very large and apparently growing number of people who would stoutly uphold the Monroe Doctrine in this Hemisphere but would refuse Europe a right to uphold a similar doctrine at Manila. Let us see how Europe is likely to regard so one-sided a theory.

CHAPTER III

Europe as a Factor at Manila

IT was right to insist that the powers should observe all the rules of neutrality and the usages of warfare while we were engaged with

Spain on the coast of Asia. Our national dignity and self-respect demanded that our campaign there should not be hampered in any way. As a war measure we had every right to bombard or capture Manila or any or the whole of the Philippine Archipelago. We had, and have the right to retain possession of the group in whole, or in part, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace and perhaps to remain in possession for a reasonable period afterward, either to enforce some conditions of the treaty of peace or to restore law and order.

Possession, however, being nine points in law, is nine and a half points in war, and the powers may be expected before very long to inquire our *ultimate* intentions. If the reasoning of the preceding chapters is sound, we may expect that they will not only ask our intentions, but perhaps make manifest their own. To preserve "the balance of power," they may insist upon a "Manila Doctrine of the East" as an offset to our "Monroe Doctrine of the West."

There are indications that they are already preparing to do so. Press dispatches of July 15, 1898, contained this item sent from Paris July 14, and apparently "inspired": "The *Matin* has received from its London correspondent, who has unusual sources of information, a dispatch in which he says the Chancel-

lories of the powers are now discussing the question of the eventual intervention of powers in the Philippines. Germany would prefer maintenance of the status quo, but if, as a consequence of the war, Spanish sovereignty disappears American sovereignty must not be its successor. An international agreement will be established, and the powers interested will each be called on to protect its own interests. *This is the logical outcome of the Monroe Doctrine, the principle of which will be employed by Europe to protect itself against American interference.*"

We emphasize the last few lines of the quotation because although they appeared in the associated press dispatches of the American papers, many of the latter have industriously avoided notice of the dispatch in their editorial columns. When they have brought themselves to discuss the Philippine problem with any regard to the Monroe Doctrine at all, it has been their usual custom briefly to assert:

1. That the Monroe Doctrine does not apply—which is wholly untenable;

2. That it is obsolete, as we are now too strong to be injured by any conquest of South or Central America—which may possibly find favor abroad, but is unlikely to find favor at home, or even in England so soon after the Venezuela affair;

3. That *WE* do not consider that it applies —which must mean that we are prepared to pose before the world, carrying Manila on one shoulder and the Monroe Doctrine on the other, an enterprise of stupendous magnitude.

Yet the point is not how inconsistent *we* may be in regard to Manila and the Monroe Doctrine, but as to what other nations may think about our inconsistency. If they differ with us, sooner or later there will be a conflict which will cost us no matter how it ends, the full value of the Philippines many times multiplied.

If we can only bring ourselves to look at the situation from a European standpoint we shall see that the prospect of such a conflict is by no means remote. In the June number of *Harper's Monthly*, "Cathay" writes: "It is a favorite commonplace to say that the world is growing very small, but, few people, perhaps, realize the deadly earnest which underlies that commonplace. For it is within the limits of this small world of ours that the nations of the earth must live and move and have their being; and in the same proportion as with the growing requirements of modern civilization each nation needs more elbow room for itself, the area within which it can hope to find that elbow room is being daily and steadily exhausted. The popu-

lation of the civilized portions of the earth has increased by leaps and bounds—that of the British Isles for instance, from sixteen to forty millions during the course of the present century, that of the states which now form the German Empire from twenty-four to fifty millions, that of the United States from six to seventy millions—the average duration of life has increased, and the progress of science and the more humane tendency of legislation combine to preserve many lives which from the purely economic point of view are rather a burden than a benefit to the community. At the same time the living wage, the standard of luxury, the proportion of unproductive to productive expenditure, have risen no less rapidly in every class of society.

"To satisfy these growing needs every civilized nation has been driven to work at a pressure unknown to former generations. Industrial activity and commercial enterprise have assumed gigantic developments. The marvelous discoveries of science have enabled the civilized world to multiply and intensify its powers of production to an almost unlimited extent. But to produce is one thing, and to dispose of what is produced is another. The powers of production of the civilized world have outstripped its powers of consumption, and

congestion is only averted by the continuous opening up of new markets and new fields of enterprise in those portions of the earth where the resources of nature and the energies of man still lie dormant. Industry, in the widest sense of the term, is, to-day, the breath of the social organism throughout the civilized world, and the cry for more trade—more markets—is as imperative as the cry of the human organism for more air when threatened with suffocation."

This admirable summary of the situation puts in quite a different light what we have been prone to call the "earth hunger" of our less favored European rivals. Their methods of opening new channels of trade or outlets to surplus population have no doubt often deserved criticism. Some allowance should be made for the peculiar conditions and obstacles with which the Old World is obliged to struggle. There is no standing still; the great powers must necessarily expand or retrograde. Spain strikingly illustrates this assertion; up to 1492 she was expanding, since then she has been retrograding. The efforts of the powers to open and develop new markets, new colonies, are really efforts to avert decay and eventual destruction. And on the success of such efforts rests their fitness to survive.

To complete the thought we turn again to

"Cathay": "In this tremendous competition the Anglo-Saxon race has, by a singular combination of energy and foresight and good fortune, secured a splendid start. Great Britain has built up for herself a world-wide colonial empire; the United States, stretching from ocean to ocean across one of the most favored regions of the earth, overshadows a whole continent. It is not, after all, unnatural that other nations, having lagged behind in the race, should resent the start we have obtained, and that when the moment seems to have arrived for finally opening up the greatest and richest field" (referring to China but these words apply both to China and South America) "which the world still holds in reserve, they should be inclined to cry to us: 'hands off! You have already more than your fair share. It is our turn now to help ourselves, and to redress the balance in our favor.' The growing jealousy with which both branches of the Anglo-Saxon race are regarded by the leading powers of the European continent is, at any rate, a fact which has to be reckoned with. . . .

"France, thoroughly awakened at last to the value of the colonial empire she once threw away, has devoted no small part of her energies throughout this century, and especially during its last decades, to repairing her blunders of

the last century. Germany, whose rapid transformation from an agricultural to an industrial state of the first rank has been a far more momentous event than her political reconstruction, is pressing on in the same course with the feverish haste of a belated traveler. Slowly but steadily, with the resistless momentum of its massive power, the mysterious empire of the Tsar moulds its policy of territorial expansion to new shapes under the influence of its silent development. And moving thus on parallel lines, they combine to curse the 'selfishness' of the Anglo-Saxon race, which bars their progress by the indefeasible right of prior occupancy."

Let us put this argument to the proof upon the map of the Globe. Study of it will show that less favored nations have reasons to fear and to envy the Anglo-Saxon. Great Britain has in her colonial system embraced all the best temperate regions outside of Europe and America, and has millions of hardy subjects on the latter continent. Almost everywhere in the Old World the other powers see the earth preëmpted or preoccupied by England. Turning their gaze this way, they again behold Great Britain ruling to the north, and the other great Anglo-Saxon nation in possession of the best and largest portion of North America.

More than that, we actually "overshadow"

the continent, as "Cathay" has said. European powers though covetous of the vast and fertile regions embraced in South America, acknowledge our dominance and therefore respect our dictum that no European power shall acquire a foothold in the Americas.

In the eyes of Europe our nation has already assumed a selfish and domineering attitude. When Germany thought of buying Cuba in 1885, and broached the subject to the government at Washington, she was informed that the cloak of the Monroe Doctrine covered both continents, from the North Pole to Cape Horn. Bismarck then said, "the Monroe Doctrine is a doctrine of insolence." While complementing our other doctrine which respects "the balance of power" in the Old World, the Monroe Doctrine is not insolent. But it would be insolent were we to claim the right to "balance of power" in the Western Hemisphere, and changing our shield for a sword, were to interfere with "the balance of power" in the European world.

Whatever the European powers may have to say on this subject, let us hope will be said before very long—before we have finally committed ourselves to the annexation of Manila. So far as the writer of this pamphlet knows, from July 14, 1898, when the article quoted

from on page 26 appeared in the *Matin*, little has been heard of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia. Perhaps there is no special significance in this silence. But then again it may mean that the powers are unable to form a satisfactory league among themselves, or that they have already done so, and that what they really desire and are waiting for, is to see us take a very small slice of Asia, and in this act surrender the control of America. In either case is it not well for us to move with exceeding great care at this crisis in the history of two hemispheres? Are we not face to face with the question, shall we suffer the Monroe Doctrine to continue a living Doctrine, or shall we do it to death with our own hands?

"If we allowed it to be known that we should not object to the colonization of South America by the powers of Europe it would not be five years before the whole continent was divided." This quotation is from a recent editorial in a leading journal of the Pacific Coast, a staunch upholder of the Monroe Doctrine. You ask, "Of course, this patriotic journal advocates nothing that would jeopardize the Doctrines?" On the contrary, with a suicidal shortsightedness, this same journal is for annexation, —and for extending *its circulation* among the devoted Filipinos.

CHAPTER IV

Vital and Growing Importance of the Monroe Doctrine

SOME of the very papers that urge Asiatic annexation are becoming alive to the greatly increased importance which the war has given to the precepts of Monroe. The enterprising journal quoted at the end of the last chapter very sagely said on the 25th of August, 1898: "The outlook of the country has expanded in the Spanish-American war. . . . The battle for the trade of China is to be fought, peacefully we hope, but possibly, with guns and ships and soldiers. . . . The powers of Europe have in the last fifteen years gone into colonization with vigor. Africa and Asia occupied their energies for the time, but when the fate of China is settled these continents will have been divided.

"South America remains, a vast area thinly populated, with soil of great fertility. . . . For the future the freedom of these lands depends on the ability and disposition of the United States to fight for them. There is no doubt of the disposition of the United

States. Our people are practically a unit for the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, and are ready to resent in arms the attempt of any European power to occupy any part of the American continents. But . . . it is not impossible that there will be a combination of Europe to smash our policy." Precisely so. And if we changed our disliked policy from a defensive to an offensive one the possibility is pretty sure to become a certainty.

And a deplorable certainty. For the impulse which the war has given the Monroe Doctrine is obvious. With the acquisition of Porto Rico and Hawaii, to say nothing of Cuba, control of the Nicaragua Canal becomes a necessity. In that our interest is paramount. England on guard at Suez, claims that the canal there links the mother-country to her colonies. The Nicaragua Canal will do even more for us. By it our east and west coasts will be brought together, and our system of defence will be made almost invincible. It is to be our Gibraltar. In time of war it should be open to our navy and closed to the navies of our enemies. Dispute over our control of this waterway by any European power would be most repugnant to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, far more repugnant than any foreign aggression or extension in this Hemisphere could have been before

we shall have become possessed of so vulnerable a point of attack.

As it is, we are even now more open not merely to attack but to *invasion* than we have ever been before. From such ports and stations as Europe owns in South America or the West Indies, fleets could harrow our coasts or bombard them. However, at this present time, any invading force would speedily be confronted with five or tenfold its number of Anglo-Saxons, and would advance to its own destruction. Suppose, in the future, twenty-five or fifty thousand Germans or Frenchmen were to hold command of the sea long enough to effect a landing in Cuba or Porto Rico, how difficult and dangerous an undertaking it would be for us first to regain control of the sea, then to transport thousands of troops, station them and manœuver them so as to dislodge the entrenched invaders. At such a perfectly supposable crisis, if we should be unlucky enough to own the Philippines, which are 7,000 miles away from us, and only a few hundred miles distant from strong and heavily garrisoned French and German colonies, what, may I ask, would be the advantage of having chosen Manila?

Once constructed, the Nicaragua Canal will justify its reason for existence, and in the eyes

of all nations, the neighboring lands and seas will acquire new value and strategic importance. Then more than one power will covet ownership of West Indian islands. For example, Denmark is willing to sell St. Thomas, which would be a great prize for Germany. Even now, there are indications that guardianship of the Nicaragua Canal, and preservation of the integrity of the Western Hemisphere may eventually tax our national strength and resources to their fullest extent without the further burden of Manila.

In the past the Monroe Doctrine has been of the greatest importance to our national peace and welfare; standing upon the threshold of the swiftly advancing future, are we prepared to abandon a Doctrine of such surpassing value that its makers, and even we, ourselves, cannot measure its precious significance to millions yet unborn?

CHAPTER V

The Questions of Duty at Manila

IN the realm of nature and of law, and of conscience, the higher duty always governs. When higher and lesser duties present their claims, and the conflict between them cannot

be adjusted, the higher duties take precedence and the lesser are not to be discharged.

What are our higher duties at Manila? In point of time, those we took there with us, the ones discussed in the preceding chapters, the ones we have assumed to our own race, to our own hemisphere, and to the powers of the Eastern World, when we planted our feet in the paths marked out by Washington in his farewell address and by Monroe-Adams-Jefferson-Madison in the Monroe Doctrine. These duties are and should ever be paramount. No wiser or finer counsel for Americans at this time can be found than the warning, corroborative lines of James Russell Lowell:

"O, my friends thank your God, if you have one, that He
'Twixt the Old World and you set *the gulf of a sea.*
Be strong-handed, brown-backed, upright as your pines,
By the scale of a hemisphere shape your designs."

As to the various minor obligations imposed on us or assumed by us at Manila, some of them are imaginary; while others may be discharged without annexing Asiatic soil and thus without conflicting with our higher duties. Any promises to the insurgents based on theoretical assumptions of annexation by us, are utterly opposed to the spirit and genius of our institutions, and to our traditional and declared

policy for seventy-five years, and should not be recognized by our government. But promises of protection from Spanish oppression or misrule, whether made to the insurgents in the field or to the limited number of the natives with whom our forces have come in contact, must be fulfilled. The fulfilling of these obligations does not entail annexation. They can be discharged, whatever nation may hold Manila, and be enforced by making it a condition of peace, especially if we retain a coaling and docking station on the islands.

There is another imaginary duty, of the sentimental order. It is said, when once the Stars and Stripes goes up there rises with the emblem of freedom our obligation to it and to ourselves never to strike or furl it. We are new to colonial wars and colonial conquests, and this is very new duty. Will its advocates kindly point out how many wars there have been in which more or less conquered territory was not surrendered at the close of the conflict, or traded for some other territory? There is hardly a war in history in which the winning flag has not come down somewhere. And it is often clearly to the victor's interest that it should.

If it is not for the best interests of the United States to stay at Manila, is she obliged to do so merely because her standards have been planted

there? We have recently been amused by the punctilios and quixotic notions of Spain and of certain Spaniards, and a keen sense of humor might serve to check the display on our own part of sentiments that are quite as high-flown and fantastic. These sentiments might seem less absurd if we had not gone to Manila solely to destroy the enemy's fleet and to obtain a base of supplies. It was a measure forced upon us by the necessities of war and leaves us free on the return of peace to depart from Manila unhampered by any feeling of false or foolish pride.

But it is urged there are duties to the seven or eight million Filipinos, beyond the suburbs of Manila, who must not only be rescued from the Spanish yoke but Christianized and civilized as well. The vagueness and the vastness of the suggestion almost benumb the faculties. In what species of crusade or knight-errantry have we embarked at the close of this nineteenth century, and how far will it conduct us? Untold millions of the African race are to-day living under the sway of foreign powers with whom at some future time we may have the misfortune to be at war. (A few million of these Africans are ruled by Spain.) If we were to send a fleet to Africa and seize a port or sink a ship or two, should we stop at that?

Would it not become a "duty" to assume at once the rôle of protector or of pedagogue to countless million negroes scattered over countless thousand square miles of swamp and jungle? The majority of the Malay and mixed races of the Philippines are almost as barbarous as the Africans and more intractable. Many of these people have shown no desire for relief from the Spaniards, and others do not require it, being practically independent. The majority of them would not understand our proffered kindness. Some of the islands are so wild, rough and inaccessible, and the inhabitants so uncivilized that it was at first estimated that 50,000 of our brave soldiers would be none too many for *conquest*, the estimate has been raised to 150,000; to afford adequate "relief" a standing army larger than this would be required. As self-respecting Americans many of us are taught that our highest duties lie nearest home. Nations and individuals who rush presumptuously in and take up distant, indefinite, self-assumed duties as a rule are not angels.

Moreover as a missionary field it is difficult to understand the attraction or the promise of the archipelago. Many Protestant Churches and church papers seem, or did seem, to look upon it with proselytic eyes. But according to *The Catholic World* about 6,200,000 persons are

members of the Roman Catholic Communion, at least nominally, and we are already besought to quell not only civil but religious war. For the insurgents have risen against church as well as against state and seek to expel large numbers of the friars. What will their many million co-religionists in this country say to that? And the Pope is already and with dignity intervening in behalf of the persecuted. If annexation is sought for the purpose of bringing the natives into the fold of Protestantism it will invite bitter religious strife at home and abroad, a strife foreign to our experience and utterly opposed to our policy, and from which every patriotic American should shrink. The Roman Catholic population of the Philippines according to *The Catholic World* for August, 1898, quoting a French ecclesiastic authority is as follows:

1892	Augustinians,	2,082,131 souls.
"	Recollects,	1,175,156 "
"	Franciscans,	1,010,753 "
"	Dominicans,	699,851 "
1895	Jesuits,	213,065 "
	Total,	6,148,250 "

All these perplexities, these new and vast responsibilities, we avoid if we avoid annexation. Humanity may demand that the islanders do not remain under Spanish rule. But

neither humanity nor self-interest requires that they come under ours. So far as questions of duty and humanity are concerned the other powers, as was indicated in a previous chapter, are compelled to extend their sway over new regions and over barbarous as well as half civilized races. With all the civilizing agencies at their command and their wide experience, it would be pharisaic to hold that we alone can restore prosperity and content among the Filipinos.

Egypt's marvelous transformation and advance within the last few years, is only one of the latest examples of England's genius for ruling alien races and developing their resources. Opposite the Philippines, Cochin-China is advancing and prosperous under the rule of France. Russia's great success in unifying Northern Asia is due to the skillful way she adapts her rule to new races, making them first content and then anxious to be Russianized. Wherever Germany's flag is raised, law and order are strictly enforced, and thrift and enterprise encouraged. The Philippines lie directly in the path of these and other powers, and directly within their sphere. The exigencies of the Cuban war placed them in our pathway to victory, but they lie far outside our sphere. We should therefore seek all the commercial and

financial opportunities which the situation at Manila offers, but at the same time, respect the rights of other powers and welcome relief at their hands from the responsibilities which do not rightfully belong to us.

CHAPTER VI

The Opportunities at Manila

AFTER a mighty and autocratic monarch has proposed disarmament, lessening of national strife, and advance toward ultimate peace, it would be a strange, portentous sight for the great and hitherto most peaceful republic of the world to cross seven thousand miles of ocean and cast her gauntlet in the face of the powers, proclaiming, "one law for us and another for you; a Monroe Doctrine for America, but none for Asia." On the other hand the great republic can mightily help the cause of peace and of the Prince of Peace by recognizing her clear responsibilities to other nations and treating them with open candor and good faith.

We cannot, dare not, abandon our Monroe Doctrine. Why then seek to compromise it? Why not rather safeguard it for the future by fully and freely recognizing its Old World

counterpart? Here lies our first and greatest opportunity at Manila. And to seize such an opportunity will be extremely politic as well as righteous. To retire from the Old World, or at least to offer to retire, on the ground that we claim no territory there, will vastly strengthen and sanction our attitude in the New World. We may then pursue our career and fulfil our destiny in our own hemisphere without fear of check or hindrance from any quarter of the globe.

Fortunately this path is still open. The protocol is merely preliminary, the final terms of peace are entirely unsettled,—at least so far as the Philippines are concerned. It appears that we shall have plenty of time to think, plenty of time to revise our estimate of the value of the islands, and to appreciate the enormous expense and responsibilities their possession will involve. So far as commercial and other opportunities are concerned, we may find almost as effectual a way to improve them without annexation as with it, and in doing so we may enlarge our field of operations far beyond the Philippine group.

Little thought has been devoted to these considerations, public attention having been diverted in other directions largely owing to the persistent clamor in regard to the mainte-

nance of our alleged *rights*, and to the discharge of our self-imposed duties at Manila. Suppose, however, that by the final treaty of peace, we are granted a coaling and naval station near Manila and one in the Ladrones; that we are also given a power to sell the islands to the highest bidder, or to several such bidders. Out of the proceeds of the sale we ought first to be paid all the expenses of the conquest and occupation; also, as a commission for effecting such sale, a sum of five or ten million dollars, sufficient to fortify our stations at Manila and vicinity, at Hawaii and Pago Pago,—*and perhaps one on the coast of China,* obtained with the consent of the powers in return for ceding our territorial claims on the islands. Any purchase money in excess of ten million and our military expenses might be paid to Spain for relinquishing her rights in the islands to their new rulers.

If any such arrangement can be made it would be the second greatest opportunity of the situation. We should be in, rather than largely out of pocket. And, what is more, the trade of China is of infinitely greater value than the trade of the Philippines. The former is our real objective, commercially speaking. There can be little fear of opposition on the part of China. Our appearance at a port on

the Yellow Sea would help maintain the integrity of the Chinese Empire, and be as welcome to England as to China. And if that empire cannot be held together very many years longer we should be in a position there to assert and guard a "sphere of commercial influence," and we would be as fully entitled to this as are any of the other powers.

A moment's reflection will show that from a commercial standpoint we have a personal interest in England's trade with the Orient that should cause us to view any injury to it with concern and apprehension. England is to-day by far the largest and best customer the American market can boast. But her purchasing power will be greatly crippled if her rivals succeed in appropriating her share of the trade of the East, which at the present time they seem bent on doing. In the *Forum* for August, 1898, Professor Brooks Adams has convincingly demonstrated that from the very dawn of history, trade with the Orient has given its possessors wealth and commercial leadership in the world. From every point of view then, China, far before Manila, is our commercial goal.

Important trading privileges, it is said, are to be had at the islands for the asking. Some have been mentioned in the dispatches, and no doubt are under consideration. It has been

proposed that American goods enter Philippine ports duty free, or with protective tariffs on some lines of merchandise. All such concessions, however, could be made or ratified in treaties of sale to other nations.

Of course it will be said that any plan to transfer the Philippines to European or Asiatic powers presents many difficulties. That may be granted without, conceding that the difficulties cannot be overcome. From recent disclosures it does not seem likely that Spain in her impoverished condition would be averse to being relieved of her charge, a most turbulent and expensive one. The prospect of twenty, thirty, or forty millions surplus from a sale would probably be an added inducement.

The second difficulty would proceed from the powers. It has been frequently urged that the powers could never agree among themselves to a partition of the islands, and therefore they would prefer the islands to remain in Spanish or American hands. Almost all suggestions of this kind however, have proceeded from *English* sources, and England's motives for wishing to keep us at Manila have already been given. Moreover, as we have also seen some of the other powers have taken quite a different line and have plainly hinted at the Monroe Doctrine of Asia, as they call it. To some of the pow-

ers the islands present many politic and strategic, as well as commercial advantages. They have had so much practice abroad in adjusting their "balance of power" and in granting to one nation "compensation" for the advantage secured by another that they have become experts in such matters.

And with so many islands to choose from, extending through many degrees of latitude and of abounding resources, it ought not to be difficult to agree upon a fairly satisfactory division. Such agreement is clearly to the interest of, at least some of the powers, and where two of the parties to a bargain have a clear interest in making it, the bargain is pretty well assured so far as those two are concerned.

There remains only the party of the third part, the United States of America. Of course the whole of this pamphlet aims to show that we have more to gain by the proposed arrangement than any of the other possible parties to it. The reported attempt of one power to interfere with the operations at Manila, even if confirmed, ought not to blind us to the rights of other powers or to our own true interests. In such a case and, if only for fear of being left out of future consideration or consultation, the offending power would surely give redress. Besides, as has been fully urged, our right to

resent or repel interference with our military movements at Manila does not necessarily involve a right to resent opposition to the disposal of the islands, for in this latter instance, the *rights* of other powers are affected.

There has been a studied effort to confuse the distinction and to maintain that any foreign objections would be as intolerable *after* as during the war. On the contrary, by persisting in such an attitude, the intolerance becomes ours. To assert that the near neighbors of the Philippines have no interest or voice in their future is both arrogant and untrue, and makes our Monroe Doctrine appear grossly and offensively unjust. Instead of being forced to recognize this we should be the first to do so, and should proceed to take the initiative by calling a conference, or at least by consulting the powers concerned. If they, for any reason, are unable to agree, or to waive their interests, our position at home and abroad will then be unassailable. If we ignore their claims, we are likely to find ourselves confronted with a strong coalition in Asia; later, this may lead to a coalition against us in America.

We proclaimed this war to be one of humanity and civilization. We cannot afford to close the campaign in a spirit of greed or wantonly to ignore the rights of other nations. The

Monroe Doctrine is worth five hundred Manilas. In the scales with the Monroe Doctrine lie our national honor and our national credit. Will the people of the United States exchange these for Manila?

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